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1. Introduction 
In recent years, analysts have developed increasingly 
strong models for identifying risk factors of genocide 
and other mass atrocities, in particular concerning the 
macro-level drivers of such violence (Goldsmith, 
Butcher, Semenovich, & Sowmya, 2013; Ulfelder & 
Valentino, 2008; United Nations Office on Genocide 
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2014).1 
However, less is known about the specific timing of 
when atrocities will start and what will make them 
start. The key question is: what shifts a country from 
being at risk of atrocities to atrocities beginning?2 
To answer that question, analysts often employ the 
concept of “triggers,” or specific events, occurrences, 
                                                          
1 For a review of major categories of macro-level factors, see 
Straus (2012). 
2 The paper uses the concepts of “genocide,” “atrocities,” and 
“mass atrocities” interchangeably. In general, the paper is look-
ing to analyze a class of events in which large numbers of civil-
ians are purposively killed. Such violence includes both group-
selective deliberate killing, such as genocide, but also non-
group selective killing, such as crimes against humanity. 
or tipping points that catalyze large-scale violence. Yet 
despite widespread usage of the term, in particular in 
policy, the concept has received limited scholarly at-
tention and analysis. Indeed, some academics remain 
skeptical about the prospect of identifying specific trig-
gers of atrocity. They worry that particular types of 
triggers do not have systematic effects on catalyzing 
atrocities; they emphasize the underlying conditions 
rather than specific categories of events.  
The question has policymaking and theoretical rele-
vance. On the policy side, understanding timing is cru-
cial for better preparedness and for developing differ-
ent approaches to prevention and timely response if 
atrocities begin. By the same token, understanding 
what ignites an atrocity crime could lead to new pre-
vention measures—if the igniters can be defused then 
an atrocity crime may not take place. On the scholarly 
side, an inquiry into triggers has at least two areas of 
potential. First, a better understanding of the catalysts 
of atrocity may lead to new theoretical insights about 
the proximate drivers of atrocity. Second, studying trig-
gers is an opportunity to adjudicate between competing 
theoretical models of genocide and mass atrocity.  
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With those concerns in mind, this paper presents a 
social scientific inquiry into triggers of mass atrocity. 
The paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, 
what is a trigger of mass atrocity? Second, do specific 
categories of events have a systematic effect in starting 
or accelerating mass atrocity? Third, in light of the sec-
ond question, does the analysis of triggers support or 
detract from any existing scholarship on the drivers of 
mass atrocity? To examine that question, the paper 
employs both conceptual analysis as well as an empiri-
cal analysis of a nonrandom sample of atrocity cases 
primarily since World War II.  
The paper offers a mild endorsement of the con-
cept of triggers. The paper finds that the effects of trig-
gering events cannot be separated from their context 
or from the influential decision-makers who respond to 
the events. The same event often has quite different 
ramifications in different countries, which suggests 
that underlying risk conditions are most determinative 
for the outbreak of atrocities. Moreover, elites have 
some autonomy in setting in motion violence, which 
suggests that agency matters. Reactions to the events 
rather than only the events themselves are crucial.3 At 
the same time, the paper finds that, under those cir-
cumstances, certain events can and do have independ-
ent effects on catalyzing large-scale violence against ci-
vilians. The paper offers a definition that seeks to 
capture these elements.  
Empirically, the paper finds that the triggers most 
commonly associated with catalyzing mass violence 
concern changes to the strategic environment, which in 
turn lends support to strategic theories of genocide 
and mass atrocity.4 Within the sample of cases, battle-
field changes, assassinations, and territorial takeovers 
are those events that are most consistently associated 
with large increases in the scale and level of large-scale 
killing of civilians. That these types of events are asso-
ciated with spikes in violence indicates that strategic 
concerns—retaining power, defeating enemies in war-
time, responding to real and perceived threats—are a 
key dimension of the onset of atrocities. 
2. Triggers of Atrocity in Policy Discourse 
The concept of “triggers” is one of the most commonly 
used terms, within policy communities, to convey an 
event that signals the start of an atrocity. In his 2013 
report on the Responsibility to Protect, the Secretary 
General referred to “triggers or drivers that create a 
permissive environment or engender a rapid escalation 
of tensions.” The report in turn elaborated a number of 
specific triggers, including a non-constitutional change 
of government; events that spill over from a neighbor-
                                                          
3 For a discussion of elite decision-making in atrocity situations, 
see Straus (2015). 
4 Most forcefully articulated in Valentino (2004). 
ing country, including armed hostilities or mass dis-
placement; internal uprisings or unrest; the assassina-
tion of symbolic personalities; security vacuums follow-
ing the removal of security forces from an area; and 
contests for power, such as elections when parties are 
factionalized along ethnic lines or where the electoral 
process lacks transparency” (UNSG, 2013, p. 6). 
The 2008 report of the Genocide Prevention Task 
Force, a US-based civil society effort to stimulate better 
policy on genocide prevention, references “triggers 
that can tip a high-risk environment into crisis.” It iden-
tifies such triggers to be unstable, unfair, or unduly 
postponed elections; high-profile assassinations; bat-
tlefield victories; and environmental conditions such as 
drought (GPTF, 2008, p. 37). 
Lastly, the updated United Nations Framework for 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, which was released by the 
joint office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Special Adviser on Responsibility to 
Protect, refers to triggering factors as “events or cir-
cumstances that, even if seemingly unrelated to atroci-
ty crimes, may seriously exacerbate existing conditions 
or may spark their onset.” The Framework in turn 
elaborates 12 indicators of triggering factors, including 
the sudden deployment of security forces or start of 
armed conflict; spillover of armed conflicts or “serious 
tensions in neighboring countries”; actions taken by 
the international community perceived as threatening 
to a state’s sovereignty; abrupt or irregular regime 
changes; attacks against the life or liberty of leaders or 
other serious acts of violence; incitement through 
propaganda; census and elections; sudden economic 
changes; discovery of natural resources; and com-
memoration events of past crimes (United Nations Of-
fice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect, 2014, p. 17). 
Taken together, some of the key policy documents 
suggest two points. First, the concept of triggers indi-
cates a change in circumstances but beyond that the 
concept remains imprecise. The Secretary General’s 
report speaks of a “rapid escalation of tensions,” the 
Task Force of “tip[ping] a high-risk environment into 
crisis,” and the Framework for Analysis of “exacer-
bate[ing] existing conditions or [sparking] their onset.” 
Second, the list of different possible triggers suggests a 
very wide range of events or occurrences that would 
cause an increase in violence. That large range would 
suggest that there are not really specific types of 
events that matter specifically for atrocities. Between 
these reports, triggers can be everything from econom-
ic crises, to environmental changes, to elections, to ac-
tions in the international community, to assassination 
and war. Both of these dimensions—a widely used but 
underspecified concept and a very expansive set of 
events that would qualify as triggers of atrocity—
suggest a need for greater analytical attention to the 
subject.  
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3. Conceptualization, Research Questions, and a 
Provisional Definition of Triggers 
Turning to the academic literature, there is less explicit 
conceptualization and theorization of triggers of geno-
cide or triggers of atrocities. That said, there are cog-
nate terms that offer insight into any analysis of trig-
gers of atrocities. One potential analogous concept in 
the academic literature is that of an “event.” For ex-
ample, sociologist William Sewell writes in a well-
known essay of an “historical event” that “changes the 
course of history” (Sewell, 1996, p. 842). Such events 
accelerate change and have the potential to transform 
relationships and structures, he argues (Sewell, 1996). 
Sewell’s main example is the taking of the Bastille in 
France in 1789, an event that was a key turning point 
that led to the French Revolution. Sewell’s focus is less 
that of an event that triggers violence and atrocity. 
However, his conceptualization of an event that accel-
erates change and has the potential to turn subsequent 
actions and events in a particular direction is useful for 
conceptualizing a “trigger” of atrocity. 
Substantively closer to the subject of atrocity, Don-
ald Horowitz writes in his book on deadly ethnic riots 
of “precipitating events.” Horowitz defines a precipitat-
ing event as “an act, event, or train of acts and events, 
antecedent but reasonably proximate in time and place 
to the outbreak of violence and casually related there-
to” (Horowitz, 2001, p. 269). 
Horowitz is not writing specifically about atrocities; 
his work here is on “deadly ethnic riots.” Yet his con-
ceptualization offers several useful insights. First is the 
idea of “precipitation,” which conveys the sense that 
an event draws in energy from the environment. An 
event actualizes tensions and emotions that are al-
ready present in a particular setting and in turn funnels 
that tension and emotion in a particular direction. The 
event itself matters, but the event cannot be separated 
from the environment and the underlying conditions in 
which it occurs. The appropriate metaphor is that of a 
“spark” or an “igniter,” in the sense that the event un-
leashes force, but where the environment and the un-
derlying conditions are analogous to the fuel.  
Second is the idea, like Sewell, that a precipitating 
event has a causal effect on the outcome of interest. 
By implication, without that specific act, event, or chain 
of events occurring, the violence that followed would 
not have happened or would not have happened in the 
way that it did. 
These various claims may be expanded and trans-
lated into research questions that contribute to a re-
search agenda on triggers of atrocity. The first key 
question is how much does the context, or underlying 
conditions, matter versus how much does the specific 
event matter when assessing why atrocities begin?  
It is unlikely that a specific type of event will 
uniquely be responsible for igniting atrocities. That is 
the case because the same or very similar types of 
events take on quite different meaning and significance 
in different contexts. Consider the case of a presiden-
tial assassination. In 1993, Tutsi soldiers assassinated 
Burundi’s first democratically elected, Hutu president. 
His assassination sparked violence against Tutsis in ru-
ral Burundi, which in turn sparked reprisals from the 
Tutsi-led army, which in turn spiraled into a long, dev-
astating, atrocity-laden civil war. Less than a year later, 
the Burundian Hutu president was killed when the 
plane, in which he and the Rwandan president were 
traveling, was shot down over Kigali, the Rwandan cap-
ital. In Burundi, the new president’s death had little 
observable effect in terms of triggering atrocities. In 
Rwanda, the shooting down of the plane was the cata-
lytic event that unleashed the genocide. What explains 
this variation in the effect of the different assassina-
tions in the same country or between countries?  
Consider another, relatively recent example. In Is-
rael and Palestine, the kidnapping and murder of three 
Israeli students in 2014 prompted Israel to conduct mil-
itary raids inside of Hamas-controlled territory in the 
Gaza Strip, which in turn prompted Hamas in Gaza to 
launch missile strikes into Israel, which prompted Israel 
to launch more military strikes, and then the violence 
spiraled. However, the kidnapping and murder of a few 
students (or other civilians) in other conflicts rarely has 
such a triggering effect. 
Another example is that of a disputed election. It is 
fair to say that in many countries that are experiencing 
transitions to democracy or that can be characterized 
as semi-authoritarian there are frequently doubts 
about the credibility of an announced election result. 
In some circumstances, the announcement of an ap-
parently fraudulent election may spark riots and pro-
test, which in turn will prompt security forces to re-
press those movements. That was the case in Kenya in 
2007, Iran in 2009, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010. However, 
in other cases, the announcement of an apparently 
fraudulent result does not have the same effect. The 
question is why. 
One hypothesis is that the underlying conditions—
the events and developments that precede the event 
as well as the levels of tensions, fears, and uncertainty 
in the environment—shape the significance of the trig-
gering event in question. What mattered in Rwanda 
was the extensive deterioration in the political and mil-
itary environment that preceded the president’s assas-
sination. What mattered in Israel and Palestine was the 
ratcheting up of tensions prior to the kidnappings. 
What happened in Kenya were the land-related dis-
putes that preceded and were at stake in the elections. 
If the context matters, then from an analytical perspec-
tive, it is important to ask how much analytical weight 
should be given to the “triggering event” per se. 
Another hypothesis is that the event’s characteris-
tics matter. If the event lines up with the contours of 
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the underlying conflict, then the event will have great-
er impact. Consider the case of Burundi. In 1993, the 
assassination of the Hutu president was interpreted as 
evidence that the Tutsi elite would not allow Hutus to 
rule. The assassination thus signified to Burundian Hu-
tu elites and ordinary civilians that Tutsis would not 
truly relinquish power, despite the democratic process. 
The symbolic and political significance of the event was 
great. By contrast, in 1994, the Burundi president who 
was killed was not the main target of the assassination. 
The main target was the Rwandan president. Thus, the 
1994 assassination carried limited political significance 
in Burundi. It did not fit into the story of the political 
and military struggle in the country.  
By the same token, consider the case of southern 
Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Most accounts claim that a 
dispute in a bar in the city of Osh between ethnic Kyr-
gyzs and ethnic Uzbeks quickly escalated into general-
ized fighting between civilians associated with both eth-
nic groups. The bar dispute followed the so-called “tulip 
revolution” in Kyrgyzstan and rising tensions between 
Uzbeks and Kyrgzs in different parts of the country. The 
context clearly mattered, and in the case of Osh the very 
local dispute resonated and fit into the contours of the 
broader political dispute. Indeed, most bar disputes and 
fights do not escalate into inter-ethnic violence that 
leaves hundreds dead, as was the case in Osh.  
A second key question concerns a tension between 
intentionality, planning, and triggering events. In the 
way that Sewell and Horowitz conceptualize events, 
the idea is that events have some causal power to 
change the course of history. Context matters in their 
accounts but so do the events themselves. Events have 
independent causal power. They crystallize energy and 
emotion and present a new beginning to a situation. 
That idea, however, can downplay the role of individual 
or collective planning before the trigger and decision-
making after or during it. The idea of a powerful trig-
gering event suggests that the trigger itself is what 
prompts individuals to act. By contrast, a framework 
that emphasizes planning and intentionality—which is 
generally how analysts interpret atrocity situations—
suggests that violence was envisioned well before the 
triggering event itself. In this latter interpretation, the 
“trigger” is largely epiphenomenal; it does not have 
causal significance. A trigger may explain the timing but 
in this framework the trigger is primarily the excuse for 
starting violence, while the real reasons for the vio-
lence have to do with elite planning well before the 
triggering event itself. 
If analysts take the causal power of triggers serious-
ly, there are arguably two primary ways to conceptual-
ize such independent effects. One is to conceptualize 
triggers as events that in and of themselves are so 
powerful that they crystalize emotions and in and of 
themselves prompt individuals or collectives to commit 
large-scale violence. In this view, the atrocity is some-
what “spontaneous,” an unforeseen reaction to a viola-
tion or transgression of such magnitude as to cause 
people to commit the unthinkable. To some extent, 
this is the perpetrators’ alibi: the violence was un-
planned; someone or something else caused them to 
act spontaneously. A total absence of planning and in-
tentionality cuts against an atrocity framework, which 
emphasizes perpetrator responsibility for committing 
large-scale violence. 
A more subtle interpretation recognizes that the 
events themselves matter but the key is how influential 
actors manipulate and use events. For example, in his 
study of violent riots in India, Paul Brass emphasizes 
that local actors transform symbolically significant inci-
dents into what he calls “categorical events” that re-
flect broader, society-level contestation and conflict. 
Influential individuals encourage others to see an inci-
dent in a particular way that resonates with a broader 
dispute or tension; there are, in short, interests behind 
how and why different events taken on meaning 
(Brass, 1998, p. 27). The force of Brass’s analysis, as it 
pertains to a discussion of triggers of atrocity, is to 
place the emphasis on elite response to events that 
have the potential to change perceptions. Here the 
events present a kind of elite opportunity. There is 
planning and intentionality but not necessarily before 
the event. The event has causal impact; it is the start to 
a new situation, in that sense a “trigger.” But what 
matters is how elites respond. Elite agency matters. 
This view is consistent with an atrocity framework. It is 
a softer, more dynamic understanding of planning than 
one that views atrocities as planned out well in ad-
vance. It accepts that there is perpetrator responsibility 
but also recognizes how, in some cases, the atrocities 
themselves were not foreseen or at least foreseen in 
the way that they were carried out. The specific trig-
gering event, which may not have been anticipated, is 
part of the causal chain. 
Consider again the question of the assassination of 
Juvénal Habyarimana, the former president of Rwanda. 
Few would contest the idea that the event triggered 
the genocide in the sense that the assassination 
marked the beginning of a new period of highly elevat-
ed violence. However, many who have studied or pros-
ecuted the genocide claim that the genocide was 
planned and prepared well before the execution of the 
president. Others, however, claim that the assassina-
tion itself had an independent effect on the dynamics 
in Rwanda at that time. In the first version—triggers as 
epiphenomenal—the genocide was planned well in ad-
vance; the trigger had little to no causal power except 
to explain the timing. In the second version, a strong 
interpretation of the power of triggers downplays the 
role of planning and intentionality. The view emphasiz-
es the power of unforeseen events to change how 
people act and to change the dynamics of atrocity. This 
is the perpetrator alibi: the assassination “caused” a 
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spontaneous reaction that led to genocide. A third 
way, as per Brass, is to recognize that the assassination 
was a significant event. It had the power to reorder 
perceptions and change strategic assessments. Yet the 
key issue is what influential elites did with the event. In 
the Rwandan case, Hutu hardliners associated with the 
former president and the ruling party established con-
trol of the state and ultimately orchestrated and en-
couraged the destruction of the Tutsi civilian popula-
tion of Rwanda.  
Consider again the case of Osh. In some interpreta-
tions of the violence, the key factor was less the bar 
dispute itself and more the local Kyrgz interests. Local 
Kyrgz actors took advantage of the dispute to oust 
large number of Uzbeks from the region, in turn capi-
talizing on their plight to gain commercial and political 
ground in the region. In this interpretation, the “trig-
ger” was less powerful than political and economic op-
portunism and specifically the actions and intentions of 
a set of local actors.5 This interpretation is closest to 
the third way or elite manipulation model. The violence 
was not planned out well in advance, it seems, and a 
bar fight in and of itself was not so powerful as to trig-
ger inter-ethnic clashes. What mattered is how elites 
responded and in this case manipulated the event in 
order to achieve what they wanted. 
A third, related question to ask is how much to iso-
late a specific triggering event from a process of escala-
tion. We might think of a triggering event as the “straw 
that broke the camel’s back” in the sense that one 
event occurred along a chain of events that each con-
tributed to an escalation of tension and violence. In the 
same vein, we might consider a trigger a “tipping 
point” or that which pushes a situation over the edge. 
In his study of the micro-dynamics of atrocities in 
Rwanda and Bosnia, Kluseman emphasizes that there is 
a period of tension, fear, polarization, and deteriora-
tion of relations that precedes significant violence 
(Klusemann, 2012). In that context, a precipitating inci-
dent can accelerate and crystalize those tensions and 
emotions, but the triggering incident cannot be sepa-
rated from the deterioration and tension that preceded 
it. Again, context matters, and the event pushes the 
situation to a new level.  
By contrast, we might consider an event along the 
lines of an earthquake, a “shock,” in the sense that the 
event itself was so momentous and singular that on its 
own it reshaped the world around it. This question is, 
in some ways, a restatement of the two earlier ques-
tions. On the one hand, the question relates to the one 
about how much to weight the underlying conditions 
and tensions versus how much to weight the event it-
self. A straw-that-broke-the camel’s-back approach is 
consistent with an approach that emphasizes the con-
text and the conditions that precede the triggering 
                                                          
5 For this interpretation, see ICG (2010).  
event itself. By contrast, an earthquake approach 
would downplay context and conditions, emphasizing 
the power of the event itself to escalate violence. Simi-
larly, the straw-that-broke-the camel’s-back approach 
is consistent with a view that triggers are largely epi-
phenomenal except in the sense that they explain tim-
ing. A shock approach is more consistent with the per-
petrators’ alibi. Both views are potentially consistent 
with the elite manipulation story.  
Consider again the cases under discussion so far. In 
Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994, there were ac-
tions that preceded (and followed) the presidential as-
sassinations that were critical for how events unfolded 
after the assassinations. Even though the presidential 
assassinations were momentous, a straw-that-broke-
the-camel’s-back approach would see the assassina-
tions as part of a causal chain. By contrast, an earth-
quake approach would see the assassinations as so 
momentous as to change in a radical sense the political 
and strategic environments. In Israel and Palestine, the 
kidnapping and murder of the Jewish students was ar-
guably one event in a spiral of violence; the kidnapping 
per se was not akin to an earthquake but is what 
tipped the situation into one that created a new period 
of violence. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the violence in 
June 2010 in Osh followed violence in another city in 
May 2010 and the ousting of the president in April of 
that year. As Horowitz suggests, in many cases, it might 
be better to consider a chain of events and a chain of 
escalation rather than a specific single event per se.  
These reflections prompt a fourth question, which 
concerns magnitude. Triggers vary by type and by 
magnitude. Is there a specific type of event or occur-
rence that typically initiates a new, elevated period of 
violence? Are those types momentous in some way? In 
some cases, triggers have dramatic national implica-
tions. A coup, an assassination, or an announcement of 
an illegitimate election result has national implications. 
Those occurrences have ramifications for a society. By 
contrast, some triggers are very local. A fight may start 
in a bar. Police may raid a neighborhood. A mosque 
may be desecrated. A fire may start. Those more local 
events may, in certain contexts, usher in a period of vi-
olence that may grow well beyond the locality where 
the initial provocation took place. The key question 
here is: which triggering events have the greatest mag-
nitude in the sense of igniting an atrocity? We can hy-
pothesize that events of greater symbolic, political, or 
military significance are likely to have a greater precipi-
tant or catalytic effect.  
To summarize the discussion, when considering the 
question of “triggers of atrocity,” there are several 
questions to consider, including: 
 How to define a trigger from an academic per-
spective; 
 How much to weight the power of the event (or 
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set of events) as opposed to the context and con-
ditions in which the event or events occur; 
 How much to weight the power of the trigger it-
self as opposed to the decision-making and plan-
ning before or after the triggering event; 
 Whether to think of triggers as part of a chain of 
escalation or as having specific significance in and 
of themselves; 
 How triggers vary by magnitude and characteris-
tics. 
These are all questions to be answered through empir-
ical analysis. 
As an initial working definition, I would define trig-
gers of atrocity as “an event or chain of events that ini-
tiate a sharp escalation in atrocity violence.”  
The definition is parsimonious and flexible. The def-
inition is agnostic on the four questions outlined in this 
section. The definition does not make a claim about con-
text, intentionality, the process of escalation, or magni-
tude. Each of those areas deserves empirical analysis. 
This definition leaves room for the importance of con-
text—triggers may take on meaning and significance in 
certain conditions. The definition leaves room for the 
idea that triggers are not necessarily one-off events, but 
may be part of a chain of events. We might hypothesize 
that triggers will trigger violence only if they have some 
significance in a political, military, social, or symbolic way 
but that claim is not inherent to the definition. 
The definition implies that some events have the 
power to catalyze decision-makers or ordinary citizens 
to commit atrocities or levels of atrocities that they 
had not previously taken and many not have planned 
to take. The definition thus implies that triggers have 
independent causal power. That is, they change the 
dynamics of atrocity; counterfactually, then, without 
such events, the atrocity would not happen; would not 
happen when it did; or would not happen in the way 
that it did. Triggering events are essential turning 
points in the overall trajectory of violence. It seems to 
me that such a claim is essential if analysts seek to iso-
late “triggers” as being significant to when and why 
genocide and other forms of atrocity occur. Otherwise, 
we might think of triggers simply as events that mark, 
but do not trigger or independently influence, events. 
The proposed definition is not a major departure 
from the conceptualization that Horowitz offers. Both 
definitions suggest that a trigger is an event or chain of 
events, proximate in time, and causally related to vio-
lence. The main differences are that a) the proposed 
definition applies to atrocities specifically (as opposed 
to deadly ethnic riots) and b) the proposed definition is 
a little more parsimonious than that of Horowitz. The 
main contribution is conceptual, rather than defini-
tional, in the sense that this paper seeks to isolate and 
analyze key questions and hypotheses that pertain to 
an analysis of triggers. 
It is worth noting is that not all atrocity cases will 
necessarily have clear triggers or sharp turns in escala-
tion. There are “slow burn” situations in which famine, 
malnutrition, lack of medical care, or related factors 
may lead to high levels of civilian destruction. A case 
such as that of North Korea, in which there does not 
appear to be a clear trigger per se, but rather a more 
constant state of deprivation, repression, and persecu-
tion. Most atrocity cases do seem to have moments 
that signal a sharp spike in violence, but cases such as 
that of North Korea suggest that such spikes are not 
necessary for atrocities to occur.  
4. Empirical Analysis of Atrocity Triggers  
To probe some of the questions raised in the previous 
section, the paper analyzes a nonrandom sample of 
cases using qualitative methods. To date, there has 
been limited qualitative, comparative analysis of trig-
gers of atrocity. In the quantitative literature on geno-
cide, politicide, and mass killing, there has been analy-
sis of “onset,” which is different but akin to an analysis 
of triggers (Goldsmith et al., 2013; Harff, 2003; Ulfelder 
& Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2015). Many of these stud-
ies point to underlying conditions that increase the 
probability of atrocity in a country, such as infant mor-
tality, a general period of instability, authoritarianism, 
exclusionary ideologies, prior genocides, or ethnic 
cleavages. But the studies also point to a number of 
plausible triggers: assassinations, leadership changes, 
election periods, military victories, and increases in de-
fense spending, in particular.  
That said, there is room for additional empirical 
analysis. First, there is no consensus in the quantitative 
literature on what triggers onset. Second, the quantita-
tive literature is not explicitly focused on triggers per se 
but rather than measuring antecedent events that lead 
to crossing into a measure of onset (such as when civil-
ian deaths reach a threshold of 1000 deaths per year). 
Third and most importantly, there is room for qualita-
tive analysis that draws out some of the conceptual 
and theoretical issues discussed in the previous section. 
With its focus on mechanisms and with an ability to ex-
amine issues that are difficult to measure quantitatively 
across multiple countries, qualitative analysis is well 
suited towards this task. This section thus seeks to ana-
lyze a sample of atrocity cases with an eye towards de-
veloping a systematic analysis of triggers. It is a theory 
building exercise, as opposed to a theory testing one, 
built around a nonrandom sample of atrocity cases.  
What then is the sample of atrocity cases? The con-
cept of “atrocity” or “atrocity crimes” is generally de-
fined in policy as including genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. That con-
ceptualization would include a very large number of 
cases, given that there are no numerical thresholds for 
most of these crimes. As an exploratory empirical exer-
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cise, this paper sought a manageable number of cases 
(N = 16) that nonetheless came from all world regions. 
In order not to bias which cases would be included in 
the universe of cases from which to sample, the paper 
draws on an established list of atrocity cases, in partic-
ular the mass killing case list in Jay Ulfelder and Ben 
Valentino’s 2008 paper. This case list was supplement-
ed with the post-electoral crisis from Kenya 2007−2008 
in order to include a case that had a lower level of vio-
lence than many in the Ulfelder and Valentino case list 
and that was election related. From there, the sample 
of cases was purposively selected to conform to cases 
with which the author had some empirical familiarity. 
The analysis is broad-gauged, macro-level analysis 
based on the secondary literature.  
The research questions asked for each case are: was 
there a sharp escalation in violence at an identifiable 
moment (i.e. was there a trigger, as defined above)? 
What prompted that sharp escalation in atrocity vio-
lence? To what extent did the context matter in driving 
the violence? To what extent did elite manipulation 
play a role? What kind of event or series of events trig-
gered the escalation? Was the event a shock or a straw 
that broke the camel’s back? The cases include: 
 The Holocaust, 1941−1945 
 Guatemala, 1960−1996 
 Rwanda, 1963−1964 
 Indonesia, 1965 
 Nigeria, 1966−1970 
 Burundi, 1972 
 Ethiopia, 1974−1991 
 The Khmer Rouge, 1975−1979 
 India, anti-Sikh riots, 1984 
 Bosnia, 1992−1995 
 Burundi, 1993 
 Rwanda, 1994 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996−2004 
 India, Gujarat, 2002 
 Darfur, Sudan, 2003−2006 
 Kenya 2007−2008 
The analysis yields the following findings. In a general 
sense, in virtually all of these cases, there appears to be a 
point in time when an event or a development in a con-
flict initiates a sharp increase in violence. The concept of 
“triggers” is validated empirically, at least to an extent. In 
this sample, the primary triggers for atrocity are 1) sig-
nificant changes in the strategic environment; 2) takeo-
vers of territory with populations perceived to be asso-
ciated with the enemy; 3) crackdowns on protest; and 4) 
violations of symbolically significant institutions.  
4.1. Significant Changes in the Strategic Environment 
The concept of changes in the strategic environment 
connotes the idea that some event or development oc-
curs in which leaders in a state experience elevated 
threat. That event in turn initiates a sharp escalation in 
violence. In most cases, the state actors are engaged in 
armed conflict, though this is not necessarily the case. 
In general, the findings are consistent with strategic 
theories of the origins of mass atrocities (Ulfelder & 
Valentino, 2008; Valentino, 2004). 
The most common scenario is where non-state op-
ponents of rulers in power launch a violent strike that 
signifies a direct and serious threat to the power of the 
ruling authorities. That threat in turn follows a period 
of growing strength on the part of the armed oppo-
nents or of growing weakness and vulnerability on the 
part of the ruling authorities. Concretely, such events 
are typically: 
 Significant military advances by insurgent organi-
zations; 
 Coup or assassination attempts on heads of state 
or leading officials; 
 Assassinations of heads of state or leading officials. 
Of the 16 cases listed above, ten fit into this category, 
making this kind of trigger the most common scenario 
among the cases in this study. Guatemala was a long 
civil war but the peaks of violence that began in 1979 
and the early 1980s followed significant gains by the 
Mayan insurgents in the Guatemalan highlands (Sulli-
van, 2012). In Rwanda, in 1963, the government 
launched large-scale violence against Tutsis after Tutsi 
exiles attacked the country and advanced on the capi-
tal. In Indonesia, the 1965 anti-Communist violence 
was triggered by a coup attempt, which military au-
thorities blamed on the Communist party and which it-
self followed a weakened presidency (McGregor, 
2009). In Nigeria, the anti-Ibo violence in 1966 was 
triggered by a coup in which an Ibo took power, and 
the 1967 and 1968 peaks of violence in the Biafran war 
were triggered by the start of that war and initial gains 
by the separatists. In Burundi in 1972, the anti-Hutu vi-
olence started after insurgents launched strikes against 
the Tutsi-dominated state. In Ethiopia, the violence 
spiked initially in response to political assassinations in 
the capital and later the violence spiked as the Tigrayan 
insurgents gained ground in the early 1980s. In India in 
1984, the anti-Sikh riots followed by the assassination 
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by a Sikh bodyguard. In 
Burundi 1993 and Rwanda 1994, as discussed above, 
the violence followed assassinations of heads of state. 
Finally, in Darfur, the violence against non-Arabs spiked 
after a major offensive by insurgent organizations in 
early 2003, following growing strength on the part of 
the insurgents in that area.  
These cases also provide answers for some of the 
questions in the previous section. First, political and 
military elites shaped the responses to the changes in 
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the strategic environment. That is, the events them-
selves provided a catalyst and they crystallized fear and 
tension, but behind the events themselves political and 
military elites made decisions about how to take ad-
vantage of the changes in the environment. In so do-
ing, they framed the events in particular ways. The In-
donesian military and ruling party, for example, blamed 
the Communist party for the coup attempt. The Rwan-
dan interim authorities blamed Tutsi rebels for the as-
sassination of President Habyarimana; in turn, they en-
couraged and orchestrated attacks against the Tutsi 
civilian population. These observations support the 
elite manipulation hypothesis. Elites often transform 
incidents into triggering events or at least manipulate 
the interpretation of events in order to start a cam-
paign of violence. 
Second, the triggering events cannot be separated 
from their context. In each circumstance, the incident 
took place within a fragile political or military environ-
ment, and typically an environment in which relations 
between opposing groups had significantly deteriorat-
ed prior to the trigger. 
Third, the characteristics and magnitude of the 
event mattered. In most cases, the incidents them-
selves had characteristics that resonated with the 
reigning political or social cleavage of the day. Moreo-
ver, all of these events signaled threats to the state and 
to the ruling order. They had significance. For example, 
the Communists were a growing force in Indonesia, and 
at least some members of the party were likely respon-
sible for the coup attempt. A Communist takeover 
would have dealt a major blow to the ruling order 
(McGregor, 2009). In India, the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi—the president—followed earlier violence, signif-
icant tension between Sikh nationalist parties and the 
ruling Congress Party, and other lower-level assassina-
tions (Tambiah, 1996). In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide 
followed three and a half years of civil war, growing de-
terioration and distrust between government and rebel 
forces, and lower-level violence; moreover, the Tutsi-
led rebels were plausibly responsible for the killing of 
President Habyarimana, again a president (Straus, 2006). 
In Darfur, the rebels launched an attack on government-
held El Fasher and captured a colonel. That represented 
a direct threat. In Burundi in 1972, Hutu rebels launched 
attacks in the country at a time when officials worried 
that a Rwanda-style revolution could occur. 
In sum, this cluster of events suggests that the trig-
ger itself mattered but also that the event cannot be 
separated from the decision-making and actions of 
elites, from the context, and from the significance and 
characteristics of the event. 
4.2. Takeovers of Areas with Hostile Populations 
The second main scenario, which is arguably a subset 
of the first, is when political authorities or insurgent 
organizations make significant advances themselves 
and come to control new territory. In particular, when 
those authorities or organizations capture territory in 
which they plausibly face a threat from populations 
that they construe to be hostile or to be associated 
with their enemy, they in turn launch cleansing and re-
pression campaigns to cement their power and territo-
rial gains. In general, the finding is consistent with the-
ories of atrocity that emphasize the importance of 
military takeovers (Uzonyi, 2015). 
Of the case list above, the three main cases are the 
Holocaust, the 1975 violence in Cambodia, and the 
1996-1997 violence in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go. In the case of the Holocaust, the Nazi state clearly 
had persecuted Jews and other groups in the 1930s. 
The state had experimented with euthanasia programs 
against so-called “unworthy” disabled citizens. But the 
sharp escalations in murderous violence against Jews 
took place in 1941 following, in particular, the German 
invasions of Poland and the Soviet Union. The territori-
al takeovers meant that the Nazis controlled territory 
with millions of Jews and, in the Soviet case, Com-
munists. It was in that context that the general plans 
for deportation of Jews shifted toward the mass killing 
and eventual extermination of Jews (Browning & Mat-
thaus, 2004).  
In the Cambodian example, the violence spiked af-
ter the Khmer Rouge took power in April 1975. Shortly 
after taking power, and riddled with internal rivalries, 
the Khmer Rouge executed large numbers of members 
of the former regime; they in turn evacuated the capital.  
In the Congo, the violence spiked in late 2006 and 
early 2007 as Rwandan and AFDL forces gained control 
of territory in the eastern region. After sending hun-
dreds of thousands of Hutu refugees back to Rwanda 
(and Burundi), the joint Rwandan/AFDL forces began 
attacking and liquidating large numbers of the remain-
ing Hutu refugee population in Congo (UNHCHR, 2010).  
As in the other cases, the changes in territory can-
not be separated from the context and from the politi-
cal and military decision-making. A strong anti-Jewish 
orientation animated the Nazi elite, and thus the way 
in which they framed their struggle shaped the re-
sponse to the territorial gains in the Soviet Union and 
Poland. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge had a radical 
ideology that called for a total and complete revolution 
of society and state. In the Congo, the Rwandan mili-
tary and political authorities believed that they were 
locked in an epic fight with Hutu forces, and two years 
before Hutu authorities had committed genocide. In 
these cases, the political and ideological context was 
essential to the significance that the territorial gains 
took, and the context was essential to the trajectory of 
violence that followed the territorial gains. In these 
cases, the decisions of elites mattered; leaders chose 
to cleanse when they acquired territory. At the same 
time, the territorial changes changed the dynamics on 
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the ground—the territorial gains increased the percep-
tion of security risks or changed the calculations that 
elites made—in these cases triggering an escalation in 
violence.  
4.3. Crackdowns on Protest  
A less common, but nonetheless extant trigger for 
atrocity crimes is the repression of protest. In this sce-
nario, political and security officials respond to orga-
nized and typically substantial street protest with a vio-
lent crackdown on the opposition. There are two main 
forms: 
 In response to a contested election result; 
 In response to a social movement looking to un-
seat a government. 
The first scenario in this case is that electoral or politi-
cal authorities announce the results of an election that 
the political opposition and some number of citizens 
find to be fraudulent. The opposition in turn organizes 
or encourages protests, which in turn prompt repres-
sion from security officials, which in turn leads to spi-
raling violence between supporters of the incumbents 
and supporters of the opposition. In the case list, the 
Kenyan violence in 2007−2008 is the main example; 
the contested elections in Iran and Côte d’Ivoire are 
out-of-sample examples of this type. 
As with a significant change in the strategic envi-
ronment and a military takeover of contested territory, 
the outcome of a national election has substantial im-
plications. The results typically concern who controls 
the country. Much is at stake. Less well understood is 
why some contested election results provoke a spiral 
of violence while others protest fizzles, never material-
izes, or does not engender a violent state response. Ini-
tial research on post-electoral violence suggests that 
close elections matter and that confidence in electoral 
institutions matter. Where the opposition believes it 
should have won and where the opposition and citi-
zens distrust the institutions that manage the electoral 
process, then they are more likely to turn to violence 
and street protest (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 
2014; Taylor, Pevehouse, & Straus, 2015). 
Another plausible scenario, which is not represent-
ed in the sample but which should be considered, is 
when political authorities repress violently a social 
movement that seeks some major change in the polity. 
An example would be when anti-government protests in 
Syria prompted violent crackdowns by state authorities.  
4.4. Symbolically Significant Violations 
The last category concerns triggers in which some 
symbolically significant violation takes place. In these 
cases, the violation signifies a transgression of some 
sort; there is a rupture that in turn sparks individuals, 
often with encouragement, to attack those who are 
seen to the authors of the violation. As in all the other 
cases, the violation takes on power, in the sense of 
mobilizing people to act, only in certain conditions and 
only with some explicit or tacit support for leaders or 
officials in a particular community.  
The main example in the sample is the anti-Muslim 
violence in Gujarat in India in 2012. In that case, a train 
car caught fire, killing Hindu pilgrims who were return-
ing from a pilgrimage. In the immediate aftermath, 
Hindu civilians and some Hindu political leaders 
blamed Muslims for setting fire to the train, and they 
proceeded to attack and kill hundreds and maybe 
thousands of Muslim civilians during the course of sev-
eral weeks.6 The anti-Muslim took place in the context 
of worsening relations between Hindus and Muslims in 
the country, and the violence was endorsed by leading 
Hindu nationalist leaders in the country, notably the 
then Chief Minister (Nussbaum, 2007). 
While there is only one case from the sample, simi-
lar kinds of triggers have occurred in India’s past. Vio-
lence has taken place in relation to the religious site in 
Ayodhya. Hindus claim the site as the birthplace of the 
god Lord Ram, while Muslims had erected a mosque on 
the site. In 1992, a mob destroyed the mosque, trigger-
ing violence in different parts of the country that left 
several thousand dead.  
In general, triggers of this type—that involved a 
symbolically significant violation—deserve some con-
sideration as analyses of triggers go forward. These 
triggers seem to generate a smaller overall death toll 
than do changes in the strategic environment. The 
stakes matter, but in most cases the national govern-
ment or a national organization is not directly driving 
the violence. As a result, the magnitude is less great 
than in those cases when states are committed to mas-
sacres to protect the state’s interests. 
5. Conclusions  
To conclude, the concept of a “trigger” remains a use-
ful one in the vocabulary of understanding and pre-
venting mass atrocities. It seems clear that, in some 
contexts, certain events constitute turning points in the 
sharp escalation of violence. These turning points are 
appropriately conceptualized as “triggers” of atrocity. 
Overall, this paper has sought to push forward a re-
search agenda on triggers by developing the concept, 
isolating key questions and hypotheses about triggers, 
and offering an exploratory empirical analysis of spikes 
in violence in a sample of atrocity cases. 
Despite the endorsement of the concept of triggers 
                                                          
6 An Indian government report claimed about 1000 civilians 
were killed (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199. 
stm). Nussbaum (2007) claims about 2000 Muslims were killed. 
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in this paper, scholars and policymakers should remain 
cautious about how predictive or how causal triggers 
are. Empirically, the same category of event may lead 
to different outcomes. The paper’s analysis yielded 
three findings that help to explain that variation. These 
findings in turn indicate that factors other than the 
event itself matter for why certain events have the 
power to initiate a sharp escalation of violence. First, 
context is critical. Triggers cannot be separated from 
the underlying conditions in which they take place. 
Second, the reactions and decisions of influential elites 
are central to whether or not events escalate into 
large-scale violence. Third, triggers of greater magni-
tude and triggers that graft onto the broader conflict 
will have greater significance. In particular, triggers 
that would seem to crystallize a direct threat to ruling 
authorities or that have broad, national implications 
seem to unleash the highest levels of violence. Certain 
events—battlefield advances, assassinations, assassina-
tion attempts, coups, coup attempts, territorial takeo-
vers, protests, and symbolically significant violations—
create the raw material to usher in a new period of vio-
lence. They increase the risk of atrocity but atrocities are 
not inevitable after those events take place. 
To deepen the understanding of escalation and 
triggers, much work remains. The empirical analysis in 
this paper is a start but the analysis remains necessarily 
superficial based on macro-comparative analysis. To 
understand why some events trigger atrocity (or do 
not), more micro-level analysis of key decisions and 
developments would be useful. In addition, while the 
paper yielded findings on some dimensions of trig-
gers—such as context, elite manipulation, and types of 
triggers—other issues remain underspecified. Whether 
triggers are best conceptualized as shocks or straws 
that broke the camel’s back (or both) is indeterminate 
in the analysis. To what extent does perpetrator capac-
ity to commit violence matter and how does that ca-
pacity interact with triggers? Are there other important 
triggers not covered here? The paper’s empirical analy-
sis did not find that economic conditions or changes 
constituted triggers. But are there other cases where 
economic changes sharply escalated violence? The 
same is true for propaganda.  
Lastly, how can triggers be anticipated and how can 
an understanding of triggers be translated into useful 
policy? Knowledgeable observers of specific cases 
should look to make educated predictions about 
whether one of the triggers isolated in this paper is 
likely to occur in a context that would result in a sharp 
escalation of atrocities. Would a battlefield gain, for 
example, have the effect of increasing threat percep-
tion? Would a battlefield gain mark some change in the 
overall dynamics of an armed conflict? Is a situation 
especially tense? Is the language of elites suggestive of 
a deep sense of foreboding and concern, such that a 
change in the strategic environment could lead them 
to change their tactics and use extreme violence? Final-
ly, if, as this analysis suggests, triggers have power but 
their power depends on the ways in which elites inter-
pret and use triggers, then that should create some 
space for external actors to influence those elites.7 
Even if a specific event could signal a new level of 
threat, there is still some margin for maneuver for in-
fluencing elites who would make the decisions that 
would determine if violence sharply escalates. 
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